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SUMMARY
Every year, BICC’s Global Militarisation Index (GMI) presents the relative 
weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its soci-
ety as a whole. The GMI 2020 covers 151 states and is based on the latest available 
figures (in most cases data for 2019). The index project is financially supported by 
Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
In this year’s GMI ranking, the ten countries that provided the military 
with particularly large amounts of resources in relation to other areas of soci-
ety are Israel, Armenia, Oman, Bahrain, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Russia, 
Kuwait and Jordan. 
The authors Max Mutschler and Marius Bales put the regional focus of the 
GMI 2020 on Europe (eastern Europe/ NATO and EU-countries) as well as the Asia–
Pacific region and look in-depth into the role of the United States there. Russia 
(ranked 8th) continues to sustain one of the largest military forces in the world. 
The European NATO countries, especially Baltic and eastern European countries, 
are continuing to arm themselves, pointing to ongoing tensions with Russia. The 
still smouldering conflict between Armenia (ranked 2nd) and Azerbaijan (ranked 
16th) over the Nagorno-Karabakh region continues to keep militarisation in the 
South Caucasus at a very high level. One look at the Top 10 shows that all countries 
in the Middle East are highly militarised by global comparison—only four coun-
tries are not from this region. The strategic rivalry between China (position 98) 
and the United States (position 27) for influence in the Asia–Pacific region intensi-
fies the mutual threat perceptions and contributes to an arms build-up there.  
Finally, the GMI 2020 looks at the link between militarisation and health 
security. A comparison with the Global Health Security (GHS) Index shows that 
countries with an average level of militarisation perform best in health security 
overall. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the public budgets of many coun-
tries are likely to come under severe pressure in the coming years as a result of 
new borrowing. This may also affect militarisation. Should the economic perfor-
mance drop proportionally more than military spending, this would increase the 
level of militarisation. But it is also possible that prevention against future threats 
to health security will be given precedence over defence policy, and that signifi-
cant cuts in military spending will be introduced. Which of the two scenarios will 
play out is likely to depend on the political priorities countries will choose.
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THE METHODOLOGY 
OF THE GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX (GMI)
The Global Militarisation Index (gmi) depicts  
the relative weight and importance of the military 
apparatus of one state in  relation to its society  
as a whole. For this, the GMI records a 
number of indicators to represent the 
level of militarisation of a country:
 \  the comparison of military expenditures with 
its gross domestic product (GDP) and its health 
expenditure (as share of its GDP); 
 \  the contrast between the total number of  
(para)military forces and the number of  
physicians and the overall population; 
 \  the ratio of the number of heavy weapons  
systems available and the number of the over-
all population. 
The GMI is based on data from the Stock-
holm Peace Research Institute (sipri), the 
International Monetary Fund (imf), the World 
Health Organization (who), the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (iiss) and BICC. 
It shows the levels of militarisation of more 
than 150 states since 1990. BICC provides yearly 
updates. As soon as new data is available, BICC 
corrects the GMI values retroactively for previous 
years (corrected data on gmi.bicc.de). This may 
have the effect that current ranks may differ 
in comparison to previous GMI publications.
In order to increase the compatibility between 
different indicators and to prevent extreme values 
from creating distortions when normalising data, 
in a first step every indicator has been represented 
in a logarithm with the factor 10. second, all data 
have been normalised using the formula x=(y-min)/ 
(max-min), with min and max representing,  
respectively, the lowest and the highest value  
of the logarithm. In a third step, every indicator 
has been weighted in accordance to a subjective 
factor, reflecting the relative importance attrib-
uted to it by BICC researchers (see Figure). In  
order to calculate the final score, the weighted 
indicators have been added up and then  
normalised one last time on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 1,000.  
The GMI conducts a detailed analysis of 
specific regional or national developments. 
By doing so, BICC wants to contribute to the 
debate on militarisation and point to the often 
contradictory distribution of resources. 
* \ The main criterion for coding an organisational entity as either 
 military or paramilitary is that the forces in question are under the 
direct control of the government in addition to being armed, uniformed 
and garrisoned.
GMI indicators and weighing factors 
Category / Indicator Factor 
Expenditures
Military expenditures as percentage of GDP 5
Military expenditures 
in relation to health spending 3
Personnel
Military and paramilitary personnel
in relation to population. * 4
Military reserves in relation to population 2
Military and paramilitary personnel
in relation to physicians 2
Weapons
Heavy weapons in relation to population 4
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BICC GMI 2020
Militarisation is a complex phenomenon. Regional 
and internal conflicts drive global militarisation. But 
the resources available to society as a whole as well 
as the different threat perceptions also play a role in 
countries’ decisions on how much to invest in their 
national military. The Global Militarisation Index 
(GMI) reflects the outcome of these processes and 
determines the relative weight of the military appa-
ratus of a country in relation to its society as a whole. 
At the same time, the GMI deliberately distances 
itself from the normative assumption that a high 
allocation of resources for the benefit of the military 
sector always represents an overemphasis on the 
military—with negative consequences for the overall 
development of society in the countries affected, and 
for international security. The security policy require-
ments for a country like Israel (position 1), for exam-
ple, are completely different from those of Mauritius 
(position 145). 
Still, some normative statements about militari-
sation can be made based on the findings of the GMI. 
It should be noted, however, that the abundance of 
factors that may affect the militarisation of a country 
suggests that one should look closely at and critically 
examine these statements. This also applies to the con-
nection between militarisation and health, which is 
the focus of this year’s GMI \ > page 13. A comparison of 
the GMI with the Global Health Security (GHS) Index1, 
developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (JHU) in 
cooperation with the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) shows that the group of countries with a rather 
average degree of militarisation shows the best results 
with regard to health security.
1 \ Global Health Security (GHS) Index (2019):  
https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-Glob-
al-Health-Security-Index.pdf; 25 November 2020
In the following text, the GMI 2020 presents  
and analyses selected trends in militarisation. Most 
of the data evaluated relate to the year 2019.
The Top 10
The ten counties with the highest levels of mili-
tarisation in 2019 are Israel, Armenia, Oman, Bahrain, 
Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Russia, Kuwait and 
Jordan. These countries allocate particularly high 
levels of resources to the military in comparison to 
other areas of society. Methodological changes to the 
GMI \ > page 6 have not been without consequences 
for the Top 10. Oman (position 3, previously 27), 
Bahrain (position 4, previously 18) and Saudi-Arabia 
(position 6, previously 28), for example, are classified 
as significantly more militarised with the new meth-
odology than before. All three countries do not have 
military reservists and, with the adjusted weighing 
of this factor, they have moved up some positions. 
There are some countries, for which we do not 
have any reliable data to analyse the distribution of 
resources between the military and overall society. 
For some countries, however, particularly Syria, 
North Korea, Eritrea or the United Arab Emirates, it 
can be assumed based on earlier surveys that they 
have a very high level of militarisation. The United 
States (position 27) that still spends more money on 
its military than any other country (2019: US $718.7 
billion, share of gross domestic product (GDP) of 3.4 
per cent), 2 is not in the Top 10 due to its strong econ-
omy \ > page 18. 
2 \ Unless otherwise indicated, all information on military expenditure in 
this publication has been taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database.
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Methodological innovations  
in the GMI 2020
This year, we made minor methodological 
adjustments to the calculation of the GMI. We, 
for instance, adjusted our formula for logarithms 
so that particularly low values for individual data 
categories do not result in a disproportionately 
low value in the overall calculation. The effect of 
this change is most noticeable in countries with 
no military reservists. As the ratio of the number 
of reservists to the overall population is a sub- 
indicator of the GMI, the value 0 (that is when 
a country does not have any military reservists) 
in the old calculation resulted in a dispropor-
tionately low value compared to countries with 
existing but few reservists. 
As a result of the corrections made, these 
countries have moved up several positions in 
the ranking of the Global Militarisation Index. 
A few countries that in turn have relatively high 
numbers of reservists, and for which these were 
strongly reflected in the overall calculation, have 
fallen by several positions. As a consequence, 
such changes in the ranking of individual coun-
tries do not remain without effects on the overall 
ranking.  
In 2019, as in previous years, Israel is again the 
most heavily militarised country in the world. With 
a population of around nine million, Israel main-
tains—through its military service system, with 
169,500 soldiers and 465,000 reservists—a compar-
atively very large military, on which it spent more 
than US $20 billion in 2019. This corresponds to 
a share of 5.3 per cent of its GDP. These, relatively 
speaking, high investments in the military continue 
as a result of Israel’s still tense security situation and 
conforms to a generally high level of militarisation 
in the Middle East (six countries in the Top 10).
Table 1
Top 10
Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI value Rank
Israel 2.4 1.7 3.1 363.2 1
Armenia 2.2 1.7 2.3 310.1 2
Oman 3.4 0.9 1.8 305.6 3
Bahrain 2.1 1.3 2.6 300.8 4
Singapore 2.0 1.3 2.7 297.2 5
Saudi Arabia 3.1 0.7 2.1 293.6 6
Brunei 2.3 1.5 1.9 286.7 7
Russia 2.1 0.9 2.7 285.1 8
Kuwait 2.6 0.6 2.4 284.2 9
Jordan 2.2 1.1 2.3 279.3 10
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Since the outbreak of the conflict in Donbass in 
February 2014, the level of militarisation of Ukraine 
has risen markedly (position 22; 2014: position 41). 
The number of military and paramilitary personnel 
has increased significantly; the existing major con-
ventional weapons systems have been comprehen-
sively modernised. Since 2014, the military budget of 
Ukraine has grown by 62 per cent to US $4.6 billion, 
representing a share of 3.4 of its GDP (2014: 2.2 per 
cent).  
The level of militarisation of Russia (position 
8), which has one of the largest military forces in 
the world with more than 70,000 heavy weapons 
systems, 900,000 soldiers, two million reservists 
and more than 550,000 paramilitaries, remains very 
high. Despite the difficult economic situation due to 
the low commodity prices and Western sanctions, 
military spending rose again slightly in 2019 to US 
$64.1 billion (3.9 per cent of GDP) after having fallen 
markedly in 2017 and 2018 from its peak of US $79 
billion in 2016. In the course of large-scale mod-
ernisation in organisation, personnel and military 
equipment in 2008, around two-thirds of all conven-
tional weapons systems have now been upgraded or 
replaced. In particular, Moscow has invested heav-
ily in its air force and strategic nuclear forces. The 
military developed from a mass mobilisation army to 
a modern combat-ready army. With the large-scale 
procurement of precision weapons and automated 
command-and-control systems for network-centric 
warfare, Russia’s military capabilities are at their 
best since its armed forces were formed in 1992. 3  
In practice, this has already become visible in  
various conflicts, such as those in Syria, Libya, on  
the Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Russia spent more  
than US $684 billion on this in the past decade.  
A further US $306 billion are planned to be spent in 
the coming years on modernising and professional-
ising the armed forces under the new procurement 
programme GPV 2027. Among other things, Russia 
plans to procure 76 new Su-57 fighter aircraft by 2028. 
3 \ Military Balance Blog (2020): Russia’s armed forces: more capable by far, 
but for how long?, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/10/
russia-armed-forces; 25 November 2020
Focus on regional 
militarisation
Eastern Europe
Because of the tense security situation and 
escalating territorial disputes, militarisation in 
eastern Europe is on the rise. When, in the southern 
Caucasus, the unresolved conflict over the region of 
Nagorno-Karabakh flared up again in July 2020, it 
resulted in the most intense fighting between Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan since the ceasefire in 1994. But 
even though the parties agreed to a Russia-brokered 
ceasefire on 10 November 2020, it is likely that Arme-
nia (position 2) and Azerbaijan (position 16)—both 
in the Top 10 of most heavily militarised countries 
in the world—will continue to invest significantly in 
their military, given the conflict situation. In 2019, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan spent 4.9 and 4 per cent 
respectively of their gross domestic product (GDP)—
in eastern Europe by far the most in this sector. The 
army and air force of both countries underwent 
comprehensive modernisation programmes. While 
Armenia mostly imported modern weapons systems 
from Russia, Azerbaijan expanded its relationships 
with other arms exporters, amongst them Israel, 
Ukraine and Turkey besides its traditional mili-
tary cooperation with Russia. Turkey (position 20) 
itself became an active party to the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Fighter aircraft and drones of 
the Turkish military attacked Armenian fighting 
positions by air. On the ground, Baku was sup-
ported by Syrian rebels who had entered the region 
with the help of Turkey. Besides the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey is also involved in other 
conflicts, such as in Syria and Libya.  
The level of militarisation in Belarus remains 
high (position 17). With 45,350 active soldiers, 110,000 
paramilitaries and around 290,000 reservists, the 
country has a relatively large military considering 
that its population consists of only 9.5 million people. 
The military has more than 2,500 major conventional 
weapons systems at its disposal, most of which were 
imported from Russia. At the time of writing, mili-
tary spending as a proportion of GDP is 1.2 per cent.  
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2020 \ MAX MUTSCHLER, MARIUS BALES
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NATO and EU-countries
With “Defender 2020”, NATO had also planned 
a major multilateral military exercise. Some 37,000 
military personnel were to take part in this. Due 
to the coronavirus pandemic, however, the largest 
redeployment of US forces to Europe in 25 years 
was cut short. The relationship between NATO and 
Russia has deteriorated massively since the annex-
ation of Crimea and the violent conflict in eastern 
Ukraine. In eastern Europe in particular, since then, 
strong tendencies towards an arms build-up can be 
observed that have contributed to a surge in milita-
risation.  
Since 2014, militarisation has increased in 22 of 
the 27 EU member states. While the average GMI 
ranking in the European Union in 2014 was position 
82, the average level of militarisation was at position 
72 in 2019. Militarisation increased very noticeably 
in the Baltic and eastern European countries, as the 
following figures show: 
Latvia (position 60; 2014: position 129) and Lith-
uania (position 32; 2014: 82) invested 0.9 per cent of 
their GDP in the military in 2014. In 2019, investment 
amounted to two per cent. Defence expenditure of 
Estonia (position 32; 2014: position 43) with 2.1 per 
cent was above the NATO two-per cent goal in 2019 
(2014: 1.9 per cent). In all three Baltic countries, the 
number of military personnel and that of heavy 
weapons systems, mostly armoured personnel carri-
ers, have increased. All in all, this has led to a sig-
nificant rise in militarisation throughout the Baltic 
region.  
Following years of reduced military spending, 
other eastern European EU-countries, too, launched 
major state procurement plans to modernise their 
armed forces’ military equipment and, at the same 
time, replace outdated Soviet weapons systems by 
modern military technology. The Czech Republic 
(position 89; 2014: position 98) invested, for instance, 
in new infantry fighting vehicles, light combat and 
utility military helicopters as well as new radar sys-
tems in 2019. Hungary (position 78; 2014: position 92) 
ordered amongst others new air defence systems and 
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, another large 
Russian military exercise (Caucasus 2020) took place 
this year in which 12,900 soldiers from other coun-
tries, such as China, Pakistan, Belarus, Armenia and 
Myanmar, participated. Both Russia and NATO are 
increasingly focusing on deterrence through military 
build-up and the mutual demonstration of military 
strength rather than on reciprocal checks, verifica-
tions and restrictions.  
Table 2
The ten most militarised countries in Europe
Land Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI value Rank
Armenia 2.2 1.7 2.3 310.1 2
Russia 2.1 0.9 2.7 285.1 8
Greece 1.6 1.1 2.7 269.1 12
Cyprus 1.2 1.5 2.7 268.2 13
Azerbaijan 2.1 0.9 2.1 254.8 16
Belarus 1.0 1.4 2.3 231.8 17
Montenegro 1.0 1.5 1.3 226.4 19
Turkey 1.8 0.7 2.0 223.8 20
Ukraine 1.9 0.8 1.8 221.6 22
Finland 1.1 0.7 2.3 203.0 29
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per cent). Bulgaria, too, (position 40; 2014: position 60) 
spent 3.2 per cent on the military, which is signifi-
cantly more than in 2014 (1.2 per cent). Similarly to 
Croatia (position 44; 2014: 53), it used the funds to 
increase the number of heavy weapons systems. In 
2019, Zagreb also set up reserves of more than 18,000 
people. 
rockets, combat and transport helicopters, self-pro-
pelled howitzer and heavy battle tanks. Romania 
(position 36; 2014: position 46) bought new fighter 
aircraft and armoured personnel carriers. Its mili-
tary expenditure increased to two per cent of its GDP 
(2014: 1.3 per cent). Measured by GDP, Slovakia (posi-
tion 64; 2014: 79) spent 1.8 per cent on its military in 
2019, which is significantly more than in 2014 (1.0 
Figure 1
Average GMI-ranking of NATO (total) and EU-countries according to region, 2014-2020 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NATO 75.3 75.1 74.2 72.9 71.2 67 65.2
Baltic 86.7 84.7 75 67 63.7 45.3 45
Northern Europe 59 58 54.3 56 55.3 51 55.7
Eastern Europe 71.5 68.8 66.5 68.1 66.5 63.4 58.6







2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Baltic countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Sweden; Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary; Central, western and southern Europe: Belgium, Germany, France, Great Brit-
ain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Spain
Source: Own presentation. 
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Meanwhile, militarisation has also increased 
in the north of Europe. EU member country Finland 
(position 29; 2014: position 33) in particular, with its 
more than 1,000-kilometre border with Russia, has 
increased its military budget and is now pursuing 
many long-planned projects designed to modernise 
its armed forces with urgency. In 2019, it spent US 
$4.1 billion, that is 1.5 per cent of its GDP, on the mil-
itary. In the coming year, Helsinki plans to provide 
another US $2 billion, representing an increase of 41 
per cent. Plans include the purchase of new fighter 
aircraft made in the United States. The NATO-state 
Norway (position 45; 2014: position 50), too, spent 
more on its military in the previous years. In 2019, 
Oslo invested US $7.4 billion (1.7 per cent of its GDP) 
while in 2014, military spending was still at US $6.3 
billion (1.5 per cent of its GDP). The number of heavy 
weapons systems increased to over 800. Procurement 
included F-35 fighter aircraft from the United States 
as well as armoured personnel carriers from Italy and 
Sweden. In October 2020, the EU-country Sweden 
(position 68; 2014: position 77) passed a new defence 
law that is to strengthen the readiness to defend the 
country against Russia in light of increasing tensions 
in the waters of the North Atlantic (Arctic), the Baltic 
Sea and the airspace over Scandinavia. It is planning 
to increase its military budget by 40 per cent by 2025. 
Funds are to be used to purchase modern weapons 
systems, among them fighter jets and a new subma-
rine as well as to strengthen cyber defence. In March 
2017, Sweden had already decided to reintroduce 
conscription for 2018. In 2020, it introduced reserves 
of 10,000 persons. By 2035, the number of troops is to 
be increased by 30,000 active soldiers. 
In central, western and southern Europe, Cyprus 
(position 13) and Greece (position 12) are high up in 
the ranking. For years, these countries have  been 
in dispute with Turkey over the huge natural gas 
reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. As a result 
of growing tensions, the government in Athens 
announced arms purchases and an increase in its  
military personnel in 2020. In addition to 18 French 
fighter jets type Rafale, it intends to order new 
frigates and helicopters, amongst others. The Greek 
Army is to be increased by 15,000 soldiers. In gen-
eral, militarisation has increased only marginally on 
average since 2014 in this part of Europe \ > see Figure 1. 
While militarisation in Portugal (position 59; 2014: 
52), Italy (position 88; 2014: position 84) and Lux-
embourg (position 104; 2014: 101) decreased slightly, 
there were increases in the Netherlands (position 
92; 2014: position 106), Belgium (position 93; 2014: 
position 103) and Austria (position 101; 2014: posi-
tion 108). In France (position 66; 2014: position 71), 
too, militarisation has risen since 2014. Reasons for 
this include the increased threat perception towards 
Russia and the declared goal of European strategic 
autonomy for which France sees itself as a key player. 
Besides the modernisation of its fleet of submarines 
and its Force de Frappe, the French armed forces are 
also currently establishing a space command against 
this background. With US $52.2 billion (2019), Paris 
is investing the most money in its military already, 
in absolute terms, of all EU-countries. In the course 
of a military framework law, military spending is to 
increase from currently 1.9 per cent of GDP to 2.0 per 
cent by 2025. In Germany (position 106), too, where 
militarisation has remained at a comparatively con-
stant level for years, this could change in the coming 
years. In 2019, Germany invested US $51.2 billion in 
its military—ten per cent more than in 2018. This 
represents the largest increase of all EU-countries. It 
should be noted, however, that given the economic 
strength of the country, the share of GDP is only a 
moderate 1.3 per cent (2014: 1.1 per cent). In absolute 
terms, this means that the Federal government has 
increased military spending since the outbreak of 
the war in Ukraine by more than US $10 billion.  
BICC \ 11 \
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Asia-Pacific and  
the role of the United States
Two small states head the list of the most highly 
militarised countries of the Asia-Pacific region. On 
top position is the city-state of Singapore (position 5). 
With more than 50,000 active soldiers and more than 
250,000 reservists, the country has a very large mili-
tary, measured against its 5.7 million inhabitants. The 
government intends to compensate for the declining 
number of conscripts that is due to demographic 
change—the army plans to reduce its personnel by 
30 per cent by 2030—by procuring state-of-the-art 
military technology. The military has already been 
cut by 20,000 active soldiers and 50,000 reservists, 
bringing the state down from second (2019) to fifth 
position. In 2019, Singapore invested US $11.2 billion 
in its armed forces (3.2 per cent of its GDP), and there 
is an upward trend. The military is already consid-
ered the best equipped in South-East Asia with the 
army having about 3,000 major conventional weap-
ons systems. Brunei (position 7) is in second place. In 
2019, the small state spent some US $419 million on 
its military; a good 17 per cent more than the pre-
vious year. Its military spending as a proportion of 
GDP rose from 2.6 to 3.3 per cent. As a result, Brunei 
climbed from position 11 to position 7 in the GMI. 
In terms of arms imports, the coastal country has 
focussed in recent years primarily on the modernisa-
tion of its navy.
China’s (position 98) rapid economic, political 
and military development is also reflected in the 
development of its military capacities, especially 
of its naval and air forces. The People’s Republic’s 
military expenditure has almost doubled in the past 
ten years. While China invested US $136.8 billion in 
its military in 2009, this figure rose to an impressive 
US $266.4 billion in 2019. This puts China in second 
place in the world—behind the United States—but 
it is only on position 98 in the GMI as its military 
expenditures represent only 1.9 per cent of GDP. 
While the military budget increased by 5.1 per cent, 
general economic growth amounted to 6.1 per cent. 
The situation is similar with regard to the other 
sub-indicators of the GMI. Considering the financial 
and personnel resources of its entire society, the 
tremendous military spending, as well as the high 
military personnel and material capacities, are put 
in perspective. With a population of just under 1.5 
billion, the most populated country in the world has 
more than two million active soldiers, 660,000 par-
amilitaries and 510,000 reservists. This makes it the 
world’s largest military in terms of numbers, with 
over 30,100 major conventional weapons systems at 
its disposal, which will be comprehensively mod-
ernised in the wake of the military reform initiated 
by President Xi Jinping in 2015. Most of the new 
weapons systems to be procured by China are now 
produced by its own arms industry, even though the 
People’s Republic is still one of the world’s largest 
importers of weapons. Russia is by far the most 
important arms supplier to Beijing. By 2035, Beijing 
aims to have completed most of the modernisation 
of its military. By 2050 at the latest, the quality of 
the Chinese military across all military branches 
and theatres of operations is to be ‘world-class’. This 
ambition is also linked to a strategic reorientation. 
Against the background of the “New silk road” eco-
nomic- and geopolitical major project, a change in 
maritime strategy from a focus on securing its own 
coastal waters to intensified, foreign projection of 
power can be observed.  
Table 3
The ten most militarised countries in the Asia–Pacific 
region, plus USA
Country Ausgaben Personal Waffen GMI Value Rank
Singapore 2.0 1.3 2.7 297.2 5
Brunei 2.3 1.5 1.9 286.7 7
Korea, Republic 1.6 1.5 2.1 259.7 14
Cambodia 1.5 1.7 1.3 223.5 21
United States 1.7 0.5 1.9 205.6 27
Thailand 1.2 0.9 1.1 159.5 58
Australia 1.3 0.2 1.5 151.3 65
Malaysia 0.9 0.6 1.0 125.5 90
China 1.4 0.3 0.8 121.3 98
Nepal 1.2 0.7 0.5 116.1 105
New Zealand 1.1 0.2 0.9 107.8 109
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In the other countries bordering the South China 
Sea, the tensions resulting from territorial disputes 
with China have not yet significantly increased the 
level of militarisation. The GMI values of Malaysia 
(position 90),  Japan (position 118), the Philippines 
(position 128) or Indonesia (position 123) have 
remained relatively constant over the last few years. 
This is certainly also due to the increased maritime 
presence of the United States in the Pacific and the 
ever-closer strategic alliances of the Indo-Pacific 
democracies. But it cannot be ruled out that this 
will change in the future. For not only China, but 
also other countries in the region, such as Indone-
sia or the Philippines, are currently modernising 
their navy. Japan, too, whose airspace and waters are 
increasingly subject to incidents with China, intends 
to build up its military capabilities in the coming 
years, based on the White Paper published in 2018.  
The complex strategic rivalry between China and 
the United States (positon 27) for influence in the 
region is also very pronounced in the maritime sec-
tor. In the South China Sea, the US-American claim to 
free access to the world’s oceans clashes with China’s 
desire to establish a security zone and to exacerbate 
the costs of a US-intervention in the event of con-
flict to a level unacceptable to the United States. The 
United States Navy last reacted to the Chinese quest 
for military dominance in the South China Sea and 
around the island country of Taiwan with large-
scale military manoeuvres which China, in turn, 
responded to with its own military exercises. For a 
few months now, both states have repeatedly been 
testing their latest weapons systems in the Pacific—
both water- and air-born. While this increasingly 
offensive competition for power that keeps intensify-
ing the mutual threat perceptions and contributes to 
a weapons build-up in the entire region is certainly 
not primarily the result of the US policy towards 
China under Donald Trump, it has been fuelled by it.  
Since the inauguration of Donald Trump in 2017, 
US-militarisation has increased. While in 2016, the 
United States was still ranked 33 in the GMI, in 2019, 
it rose to position 27. During Trump’s four-year term 
of office, military expenditure increased from US 
$669.4 billion (2016) to US $718.7 billion (2019). Since 
2017, Trump’s national defence strategy has not only 
bolstered the Pentagon’s financial resources but also 
increased the number of troops. The navy received 
an additional 10,000 soldiers. The army expanded by 
6,400, the air force by as many as 15,700. Altogether, 
the United States has more than 1.38 million mili-
tary personnel—only China (2.3 million) and India 
(1.45 million) have more soldiers. The number of 
heavy weapons systems has increased markedly by 
1,670 since 2016 so that the United States are now in 
possession of more than 53,100 modern major con-
ventional weapons systems—including 3,780 combat 
aircraft. Trump’s political agenda foresaw the return 
to the ‘rivalry of Great Powers’, which also affected 
the nuclear weapons policy of the United States. 
Thus, he continued modernising the US nuclear 
arsenal announced in the Nuclear Posture Review 
in 2018, action that had already been initiated by 
the Obama Administration. In 2018, the Pentagon 
began to procure more powerful and versatile types 
of warheads with the justification of enabling a more 
specific deterrence of Russia and China. In 2021, the 
funds for the modernisation of nuclear warheads are 
to increase again markedly by 25 per cent to about  
US $15.6 billion.
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Militarisation and 
health security
Although there is no uniform definition of the 
term ‘health security’, it usually refers to measures 
or capabilities that are to protect the population 
against a number of natural and human-made 
threats to their health. These threats include natural 
disasters and environmental pollution, but also, and 
in particular, (newly emerging) contagious diseases 
that can develop into epidemics and pandemics. 
The possible link between the level of militarisation 
of a country and its capacity to ensure the health 
security of its population lies in the way the state 
distributes its resources, particularly its financial 
resources. Funds designed for the defence budget are 
not available for the civilian sector and thus not for 
the health sector—and vice versa. There are indeed 
overlaps between military and health security—for 
example, when the military is deployed for disaster 
relief, or military personnel are involved in fighting a 
pandemic. However, the questions also arise whether 
the distribution of resources in favour of the military 
in highly militarised countries is at the expense of 
health security and whether less militarised coun-
tries correspondingly show a higher level of health 
security. To pursue these questions and to identify 
possible links between militarisation and health 
security, we will compare the GMI in the following 
with the values of the Global Health Security (GHS) 
Index.  
The GHS Index is a project of the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (NTI) and the Johns Hopkins Center for 
Health Security (JHU), developed in cooperation with 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). It collects 
data on the health security capabilities of 195 coun-
tries. These capabilities are divided into six cate-
gories: Prevention, Detection and Reporting, Rapid 
Response, Health System, Compliance with Interna-
tional Norms and Risk Environment. For example, 
in the Detection and Reporting category, data on lab 
systems and the epidemiological staffing levels are 
collected. The Health System category includes data 
on the capacity of hospitals, infection control and 
access to healthcare. All data have been obtained 
from publicly accessible sources of the respective 
countries or international organisations, such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the World 
Bank. 4 In the following, we will compare the GHS 
and the GMI—albeit in a limited fashion—to point to 
some possible, basic links. 
The average score of all 195 countries of the GHS 
Index is 40.2 (of 100 possible points). According to the 
GHS study, this illustrates the low level of prepared-
ness and ability to deal with health threats globally. 
According to their score, all countries are divided 
into three categories: Most Prepared, More Prepared 
and Least Prepared. If we compare the GMI with 
this, we find that the 30 most heavily militarised 
countries on average show a GHS Index value of 44.3 
(corresponds to 78th place in the GHS Index). South 
Korea (14th place), the United States (27) and Finland 
(29) are the only countries of that group that are 
classified as Most Prepared in the GHS. By contrast, 
Brunei (7 place), Algeria (15), Iraq (18), Botswana (24) 
and Mauritania (30) are Least Prepared. The large 
majority of the 30 most militarised countries can be 
found in the More Prepared category.
4 \ Besides many other factors, the data on health expenditures and 
medical personnel are also part of the calculations of the GMI, which 
describes the relation between military spending and military person-
nel of a country with these data. A precise, more in-depth investigation 
needs to break down the two indexes further.
Table 4





Average score GHS Index 44.3
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Most of the 30 least militarised countries, 
namely 20, can also be found in the same category 
of the GHS Index (More Prepared). Still, we have not 
identified one single country here that qualifies for 
the Most Prepared category of the GHS. By contrast, 
we can find ten countries that have been classified as 
Least Prepared. Among these are Haiti (151th place), 
Papua New Guinea (142), Lesotho (133) or Guatemala 
(132). The average score of this group of countries in 
the GHS Index is only 38.2—and thus markedly below 
the average GHI Index score of the 30 most heavily 
militarised countries in the world.  
So, the equation that highly militarised countries 
score worse when it comes to health security as they 
spend too many resources on the military is wrong. 
Rather, at first glance, it seems to be the other way 
around: It is the least militarised countries that have 
worse overall health security scores. We believe that 
there is a plausible explanation for this: The coun-
tries with a particularly low level of militarisation 
are predominantly countries whose governments 
generally have few resources available due to the 
general economic situation. In other words, countries 
such as Haiti or Lesotho only have a comparatively 
low GDP of which they only spend a small proportion 
on their military. At the same time, the remaining 
resources—in absolute terms—are not sufficient to 
achieve adequate standards of health security. 
This is in line with earlier findings on the con-
nection between militarisation and state fragility, 
according to which the majority of the least milita-
rised countries are so-called low-capacity states  
\> Global Militarisation Index 2019. These are countries that 
can only provide limited public services. 
However, this does not mean that a high level of 
militarisation is totally unproblematic or even desir-
able in terms of health security. If we take a look at 
the countries with an average level of militarisation, 
we find that precisely this group performs best when 
comparing the GHS scores. Among the 30 countries 
in the positions 61 to 90, there are seven countries 
that, according to the GHS Index, are in the Most 
Prepared category: Switzerland (63rd place), Australia 
(65), France (66), Sweden (68), Denmark (70), Slovenia 
(72) and Great Britain (77). And even though there are 
also eight countries that are Least Prepared, accord-
ing to the GHS, the average GHS Index score of 48.4 
is higher than the average score of the group of the 
30 most heavily militarised countries. Moreover, this 
not only applies to the overall score of the GHS Index. 
The countries on positions 61 to 90 of the GMI are 
also on average above the 30 most militarised coun-
tries in all six sub-categories of the GHS (Prevention, 
Detection and Reporting, Rapid Response, Health 
System, Compliance with International Norms and 
Risk Environment). So, with all the caution that is 
required for such a cursory comparison of data, it is 
at least possible that high investments in the mili-
tary by some of the most heavily militarised coun-
tries, such as Russia, Greece or some countries in the 
Middle East, are at the expense of health security.
Table 5





Average score GHS Index 38.2
BICC \ 15 \
GLOBAL MILITARISATION INDEX 2020 \ MAX MUTSCHLER, MARIUS BALES
Finally, the question arises which effects  
COVID-19 and especially the economic consequences 
of this crisis will have on global militarisation. Even 
if the indirect and direct economic consequences 
of the pandemic cannot be predicted at the present 
time, it is almost certain that the public budgets in 
many countries will be under great pressure in the 
coming years as a result of new borrowing to com-
bat these consequences. This is also likely to have 
an impact on military spending. Two scenarios are 
conceivable: In the first scenario, there will even be 
an increase in militarisation as the economic effects 
of COVID-19 will lead to a proportionally greater 
decline in economic performance (measured by GDP) 
than in military expenditure. The second scenario is 
the opposite, where military spending will fall more 
sharply than GDP, leading to a drop in militarisation. 
Which of the two scenarios will play out is likely to 
also depend on whether the constraints on public 
spending will lead to a real shift in political prior-
ities, thus giving health policy and the prevention 
of future threats to health security precedence over 
defence policy. 
Table 6





Average score GHS Index 48.4
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The depiction and use of boundaries or frontiers and 
geographic names on this map do not necessarily 




Source conflict data: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Sources of administrative boundaries: Natural Earth Dataset
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Rank 1–30 Rank 31–60 Rank 61–90 Rank 91–120 Rank > 120
no data available  Participation as a main actor in armed conflicts (2019)
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